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Massive Industrial Size, Classical
Economics, and the Search for Humanistic Value*
Joseph F. Brodleyt
IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATON. By fohn S. McGee. New York:
Praeger Publishers. i97I. 167 pages. $io.oo.
The Supreme Court has stated that containment of economic power is
a national economic policy of prime importance. It is a policy at once
"fully consonant with economic theory,"' and directly promotive of a sys-
tem of "fragmented industries and markets."' A deliberate policy of eco-
nomic decentralization, contaiment is also supported by non-economic
values, for in adopting it Congress freely consented that "some price might
have to be paid."3
In Defense of Industrial Concentration directly challenges that eco-
nomic policy. By asserting that the attempt to contain economic power
by any force extraneous to the operation of the free market is an economic
mistake and a political intrusion, Professor McGee argues that to accept
the prevailing viewpoint-which rests on neither coherent economic theory
nor empirical justification-is to retreat from the clear light of classical
economics4 and to immerse the state in the darkness of bad economics and
confused morality. Consequently, McGee attempts to reveal the errors
of the false economic beliefs about industrial size. His argument rests on
both an explicit economic analysis and a largely implicit moral outlook
and value system. Accordingly, this review will respond on both levels:
the economic-analytical (Sections I-IV) and the moral-humanistic (Sec-
ton V).
* I am indebted to Professor Arthur Schweitzer of the Department of Economics of Indiana Uni-
versity for reading my manuscript in an earlier stage and for valuable comments.
1 B.A. 1949, University of California at Los Angeles; LL.B. 1952, Yale University; LL.M. 1953,
Harvard University. Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington) School of Law.
I. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
2. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
3. 374 U.S. at 37X.
4. The terms "classical" and "classical economics" are used freely, following the precedent of
J. M. Keynes, to encompass the fundamental viewpoint contained in the work of Ricardo, Mill,
Marshall, and Pigou, but with particular concern here for the micro- rather than the macroeconomic
aspects. See J. KNaz s, THE GENE.AL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREsr, ANm MONEY 4 n.i. (Har-
binger ed. 3964).
The method of "classical economics" requires the assumption for analytic purposes of (I) per-
fectly competitive markets and (2) consistently rational pursuit of individual welfare by economic
man, whether as producer or consumer. See W. PEasEorN, INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND ECONOMIC
GRowra 86 (1967). Particularly as reflected in the work of Frank H. Knight and many of his follow-
ers at Chicago (sometimes called neo-dassical), this is a method of analysis based heavily on idealized,
logical-philosophical thinking, as contrasted with methods more susceptible to empirical validation or
scientific prediction of behavior. See 8 INT'L. ENCY. SoC. Sc. 424-26 (1968); 14 INT'L. ENCY. Soc.
Sc. 261 (1968). McGee acknowledges his indebtedness to Knight: "This book borrows freely from
Knight." P. 6.
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McGee is an economist of the classical "Chicago School." Indeed, the
book is notable for its clear statement of the Chicago School's faith in the
free economic market and disbelief that industrial concentration itself con-
veys market advantages. Since the classical model poses the only serious
theoretical challenge to the dominant economic view of industrial concen-
tration in the United States and other capitalist countries,' the book com-
mands attention on this ground alone. Many readers will also find useful
its clear statement of the gist of current theories of oligopoly and its sum-
mary of the empirical evidence on oligopoly performance.
Consistent with the classical model, McGee urges that antitrust policy
be founded not on conjectural theories of economic concentration, but
rather on "a general presumption in favor of the outcomes produced by
a property and market system."8 In pursuing this thesis McGee examines
the concept of competition, suggesting the existence of more latitude in the
interpretation of that term than is generally supposed. Indeed, McGee
challenges us to decide what precisely it is that we mean by "competition";
for before any accurate meaning can be given we must identify some par-
ticular goal or function that we wish competition to serve.
For McGee the prime economic goal to be served by competition is the
maximization of producer and consumer welfare-the sum total of indi-
vidual preferences expressed through buyer choice in the market place.
Such maximum fulfillment of individual buying choices to the joint benefit
of producers and consumers is the end goal of the competitive system and,
when aggregated into mass consumer demand, the motive power that
makes the system work. And it does work, free of serious distorting influ-
ences, in fulfillment of the utilitarian ideal. At any rate, McGee asserts,
we can make no better assumption.
The task of government policy in such an economic universe becomes
relatively simple. The government should keep hands off! It should let the
market function freely, with minimum regulatory intervention. From these
premises it is an easy step to McGee's specific policy suggestions: (i) estab-
lish a rebuttable presumption that a firm that has grown to monopoly size
has done so lawfully; (2) abandon all presumptive rules as to mergers,
analyzing each merger on its total economic effect, with special tolerance
for those deemed likely to achieve efficiencies; (3) remove legal barriers
5. This can be seen in the work of conservative antitrust scholars, such as Professors Bork and
Bowman of Yale. See Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLumu. L. REV. 363 (x965). See
also Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly: The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 Am. EcoN. Rxv. 242 (1967).
The Chicago classical approach is also evident in the General Motors memorandum to the Senate
subcommittee investigating the automobile industry, a document which reflects many of the views
expressed by McGee. See Hearings on Planning, Regulation, and Competition: Automobile Industr-
z968, Before the Subcomms. of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 9oth Cong., 2d Sess.
698-700, 707-15 (1968).
6. P. 13 6.
[Vol. 24: Page 11471156
BOOKS REVIEWED
to entry into the regulated industries; and (4) reject for all policymaking
purposes whatever the myth that there is a relation between competition
and high concentration 7
These conclusions necessarily lead McGee to reject sharply the recom-
mendations of the Neal White House Task Force Report on Antitrust
Policy, which urged deconcentration of industries having four firm con-
centration ratios of 8o percent or more. Indeed, he rejects even the more
conservative Stigler White House Task Force Report's recommendation
which called merely for scrutiny of highly concentrated industries and
suggested the possibility of divestiture only in connection with aggravated
cases of collusion
To reach such striking conclusions upholding the catholicity of the free
market, it is necessary for McGee to destroy the two pillars of the prevailing
outlook: economic models and empirical studies. The economic models
project a fundamental tendency on the part of highly concentrated oli-
gopoly markets to behave in a manner approaching that of monopoly. The
empirical studies purport to show a correlation between high industrial
concentration and undesirable economic behavior, namely excessive profits
and low technical innovation.
In his dual challenge, McGee charges that the oligopoly models are
defective constructs, and the empirical findings fallacious and inadequate.
Both overlook the key element of economic welfare-the efficiency with
which consumer demands are satisfied.
McGee is indeed a bold spokesman for the classical faith. At every op-
portunity he confronts the opposing models and the evidence with his own
model. While I may disagree with his conclusions, I admire his style. More-
over, the approach he takes gives a correct emphasis to the fact that the use
of models as an analytic tool in the social sciences, as in the natural sciences,
is indispensable; that when dealing with a complex system, such as the
problem of industrial concentration, it is essential to abstract from the sys-
tem a limited number of characteristics which we identify as crucial and
explanatory. Indeed, there is no other way to think about the subject in a
systematic way. The meaningful questions then become whether the model
is plausible, whether it is supported by available empirical evidence, or
whether other theories may be superior.9 McGee's analysis falls short in
its failure to explore fully the ethical and moral values implicit in the model.
He fails to recognize that a model as it becomes embedded in the idea
structure of society, can come to live a life of its own-tending to perpetuate
and cause the very behavior it sought originally to describe.
7. PP. 132-37.
8. Pp. 124-32.
9. See generally W. Vicmy, M"cRosTATIcs 5-1i (z964).
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In the discussion that follows we will pursue McGee's analysis as far as
it takes us, through the worlds of oligopoly models and empirical evidence
to the pure theory of large firm superiority; ending with a reconsideration
of the policy toward industrial concentration. Thereafter, we must leave
McGee in an attempt to approach values not within the ambit of the clas-
sical system.
I. Tii OLIGOPOLY MODELS
McGee deems four families of oligopoly theory worthy of discussion:
(i) joint profit maximizing, (2) the Cournot theory, (3) cartel instability,
and (4) entry theories.
A. Joint Profit Maximization
The theory that has had the greatest influence on the courts is that of
joint profit maximization as enunciated by Chamberlain, Fellner and oth-
ers."0 It is an appealing theory since it rests on the assumption of the ration-
ality of business decisionmakers. The theory suggests that where a market
has few sellers, they will recognize that their fortunes are not independent;
that a sharp gain in market share by one seller causes a steep, unacceptable
loss in market share by other sellers. Hence, price cutting by one seller will
induce uniform price cuts by the others. All sellers find it in their interest
to come to a mutual but non-conspiratorial understanding that price com-
petition is harmful to their joint welfare. As a result, their conduct tends
to approach that of a single firm monopoly."
B. The Cournot Theory
McGee asserts, however, that it is not the joint profit maximizing model
but the Cournot theory, which provides the only solid basis for current anti-
trust policy. This is because the Cournot model, unlike the joint profit
maximization model, predicts increasing output and decreasing price in
a highly concentrated market based on an increase of as little as a single
firm. The behavioral assumptions of the model are, however, simplistic.
The Cournot model assumes that a firm is free to vary output but not price.
Although the firms recognize that changes in output invariably affect price,
they never learn to anticipate their rivals' responses. They repeatedly assume
that their rivals will produce at the same output during the present financial
so. See E. CHAmBErLiN, THE TnEoRy oP MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 46-55 (8th ed. x962);
W. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG =E FERw 3-50 (1949). See also F. MAcHLuP, THE Eco.-TomIcs oF
SELLERS COMPETIION 414-46 (x952).
The theory was used explicitly as a basis for decision in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 363-64 & nn. 38, 39 & 41, and importantly, if somewhat less explicitly, in subsequent
decisions. See Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts: From Economic The-
ory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285, 297-313 (1967).
ii. Pp. 61-66.
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period as they did during the last. Thus, each firm continually makes the
mistake of thinking it can unilaterally expand or contract output without
competitor response. This assumption becomes correct only under one con-
dition-when the "Cournot equilibrium point" is reached. This occurs
when, after numerous trials, a firm finds itself producing at an output
which is optimal for both prior and current financial periods. At that point
for each firm, the generally false assumption that the future will be like
the past becomes true and the Cournot equilibrium is reached.' 2 This
equilibrium point, which lies between the monopoly and competitive price,
approaches a competitive result as the number of firms increases. 8
C. Cartel Instability
Professor George Stigler's cartel instability theory is Machiavellian in
its assumptions about business behavior. Whereas under the joint profit
maximization model the firms were in a sense forced to collusion by the
recognition that price competition was self-defeating, in the cartel insta-
bility theory the firms have a positive desire to collude. So relentless is the
search for profit, moreover, that even this does not suffice. While taking its
allotted share of sales at the collusive monopoly price, each firm desires
to capture additional sales at its competitors' expense. This can be done
by secret price cutting ("cheating"), which permits a firm to expand its
market share and profit without undermining the general collusive price.
Thus, the highest state of welfare for a firm is for its competitors to be
rigorously bound to the collusive (or cartel) price while it remains free
to deviate at will. But as other firms come to the same conclusion more
and more sales are made at a discount. This undercutting of the collusive
price increases consumer welfare; thus the object of public policy should
be to promote cheating. The way to do this is to induce firms to believe
that they can undercut price without high risk of detection. Since the risk
of detection will vary inversely with the availability of information on
prices, the technique of public policy is to impede the flow of information
about prices sufficiently that clandestine cheating will occur. One method
of inhibiting information flow is to increase the number of sellers. The
12. This point can be determined mathematically, given the rigid assumptions of the model.
See F. MAcHLptJ, supra note 10, at 377 n.g. However, it would violate the behavioral assumptions of
the model to conclude that any firm would recognize such an advanced solution.
13. Pp. 54-61. McGee describes several modern variations of the theory: Bertrand makes price
rather than output the independent variable and reaches a competitive result even under duopoly con-
ditions. Bowley and Stackelberg introduce the more realistic assumption, contrary to Cournot, that a
firm anticipates reactions by its rivals; but McGee finds that such "rival reaction" theories lead only
to indeterminacy, in view of the large number of reactions possible. Pp. 59-61. Game theory, also a
rival reaction theory, is mentioned by McGee merely in passing-a serious omission in my view. P. 6i.
McGee's explanation of the Cournot model will probably not be clear to those lacking substan-
tial economic background. The best non-mathematical explanation I have seen is F. MAcstup, supra
note to, at 368-77, 411-12.
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more sellers there are, the less ripple will be caused in the market by any
particular price cut. Thus, the collusive price is undermined by the cumu-
lative effect of the many individually secret price cuts.'
D. Entry Theory
Each of these three theories neglects the effect of new firms entering
the market. The fourth family of theories, however, focuses specifically on
this effect. There are two main types of entry theories. The first asserts that
oligopolists, looking to long term profits, set prices at levels intended to
forestall new entries. To maximize long term profits, these firms seek to
establish prices just low enough to discourage entry by additional firms. In
a sense this theory is a version of the joint profit maximization theory ex-
cept that in the entry model the firms take a longer range view of their
welfare. Market price moves not toward the high, short run monopoly
level, but toward a lower, long run monopoly position.
A second type of entry theory, in sharp contrast to the first, seems to
make any policy against industrial concentration unnecessary. According
to this theory, entry is an ever present threat whenever the market price
exceeds the competitive price. Thus, threat of entry tends to force even a
monopolist to charge a competitive price'
E. McGee's Criticisms
In McGee's view, all of the oligopoly theories discussed above have seri-
ous individual weaknesses. The joint profit maximization model is accu-
rate only if the number of firms is quite small or if the firms have perfect
knowledge of each other's prices and products, which is an unrealistic
assumption. The Cournot model is even more naive in its assumptions,
unproved by empirical evidence and incomplete in the economic phenom-
14. Pp. 66-72. McGee points out that Stigler's theory is largely untested empirically; moreover,
he urges that even if true, the theory does not inform us that the best variable to manipulate is the
number of firms. Other variables that could be controlled are flow of information, price discrimina-
tion constraints, and number of buyers.
The Stigler and other similar cartel-theory models provide the theoretical base for Professor
Posner's recent proposal that uniform pricing action in oligopoly markets may, when accompanied
by certain other economic indicia, justify a finding of collusion without proof of direct agreement or
even communication between firms. The Stigler cartel-theory model is crucial to Posner's analysis be-
cause it projects a breaking down of collusive prices under the pressure of cheating unless unusual
economic forces provide a kind of coordination or enforcement mechanism; in Posner's view the
existence of such economic forces, although dificult to ascertain provides the basis for drawing the
line between a price uniformity that is collusive and unlawful (cheating effectively prevented) and
one that remains competitive and lawful (cheating remains possible). See Posner, Oligopoly and the
Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. Rav. X562, 1569 n.24, 1572 n.31, 1569-75
(1969). Whatever its theoretical merit, in application the proposal raises extreme problems of proof.
Id. at 1578-83, 1593. See also note 40 infra.
x5. Pp. 72-75. Some recognition of the first entry theory (the Bain-Sylos-Modigliani view), can
be seen in recent Supreme Court decisions that have emphasized the importance of preserving the
possibilities of potential competition-i.e., threat of new entry. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 575 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964). The
second view (the Demsetz and Day models), so far as I know, has not received judicial recognition.
116o [Vol. 24: Page 1147
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ena it describes. The cartel instability model is likewise unproven empir-
ically and fails to indicate which of several potential variables should be
manipulated to stimulate price competition. Entry theories simply cut in
too many directions.
Moreover, McGee finds it a grievous weakness that all of these theories
are unable to identify the difference between a competitive and a non-com-
petitive market structure. At best, the theories tell us that as the number
of firms in a market shrinks, some point is reached at which the number
becomes too small to sustain price competition. This provides no adequate
basis for public policy.
Without detracting from McGee's analysis, I draw quite opposite policy
conclusions. I find it striking that almost all of the theories converge on
the structuralist conclusion that highly concentrated markets are likely
to behave non-competitively in the classic economic sense. That is to say
price will be substantially above and output substantially below the com-
petitive level, leading to economic profit and misallocation of resources.
Moreover, the additional theoretical approaches of game theory and con-
flict analysis, not considered by McGee, also point in this direction." The
inability of oligopoly theories precisely to distinguish competitive and non-
competitive market structures is not a deterrent to effective policymaking;
for we still know the direction of desirable policy change, and this is fre-
quently enough for effective action. Similarly, the failure to know the limit
beyond which policy change effects no improvement is not a barrier to
effective policymaking, unless (i) there are costs associated with exceed-
ing such limit, and (2) such costs exceed the costs of remaining at the
status quo. At the core of McGee's case in defense of industrial concentra-
tion is the contention that there are such costs and that they are substantial,
as discussed below1
x6. See T. ScHELLiNG, THE STRATEGY oF CoNFLI c 53-80 (Oxford paperback ed. x96o);
1r INT'L ENCY. Soc. Scl 287 (1968); Scherer, Focal Point Pricing and Conscious Parallelism, 12
ANrmusr BU-. 495 (1967); Shubik, A Game Theorist Looks at the Antitrust Laws and the
Automobile Industry, 8 STAN. L. REv. 594 (x956). See also Marris, The Modern Corporation and
Economic Theory, in ThE CoRPoRATE ECONOTY, 270, 283-304 (R. Marris & A. Wood eds. 1971).
z7. McGee alludes briefly to "the general theory of the second best" as an additional theoretical
barrier to the formulation of a vigorous antitrust policy. Pp. 17, 79. In general terms, the theory states
that the conditions of competition are not "additive" but instead are "interrelated" such that "if one
condition of a state of workable competition is absent, even the presence of all the other essential con-
ditions might not make competition workable." 2 INT'L ENCY. Soc. Sc. 510 (968). Applying this,
McGee states that a change designed to improve competition in one industry may actually make things
much worse in other industries involved in economic relationships with the changed industry. P. 17.
However, the point is not developed, and McGee seems to place little emphasis on it.
This is perhaps wise in view of McGee's primary reliance on economic efficiency as the justifica-
tion of economic size. A theory which holds that there is no basis for predicting that policy changes
made in one sector will not injure allocative efficiency in other sectors really says too much. For ulti-
mately what this means in complex, real world situations is that the allocative effects of change are
indeterminate. See F. ScErER, INusrams. MA=KT SnTuc-ruR AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 25-26
(971). Thus the theory provides no argument for either change or the status quo in terms of eco-
nomic efficiency. Indeed, the logic of this analysis is to turn from allocative efficiency as a goal for
June 1972 ]
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II. Ti- EvilpmcAi. S'TrIs: PROFITS AND INNOVATION
Critics of industrial concentration have been able to buttress their view-
point with the findings of several empirical studies showing a strong corre-
lation between high concentration ratios and undesirable economic be-
havior. Moreover, unlike the economic theories the empirical studies do
provide a basis for drawing a line between concentration levels that are
undesirably high and those that are tolerable 8 In fact, McGee traces the
1968 Neal White House Task Force recommendation for deconcentration
of industries having a four-firm concentration ratio of 70 percent or more
directly to the Bain study. Although McGee's advocacy of industrial con-
centration would scarcely falter even should it be established that such
studies were irrefutable (see Section III infra), the doctrine against con-
centration has relied importantly on them. Accordingly, opponents of that
doctrine have a natural interest in attacking the studies.
McGee charges that the profit studies, showing a correlation between
high profits and high concentration, are spurious in the light of other
studies which show the correlation to become weaker or disappear if one of
several plausible adjustments are made: for example, (I) adjusting upward
the profits of smaller corporations to take account of the bias due to tax
factors which induce such corporations to pay relatively high salaries to
officer-shareholders; (2) narrowing the profit measure to particular product
lines rather than whole industries; (3) computing profits over longer spans
of time.2 ' The strength of the correlation between profits and concentration
remains a disputed point. McGee fairly calls to our attention the counter
evidence, which is significant and, while a minority economic view, tends
economic policy and to embrace other goals of a social and political nature, such as economic decen-
tralization and distributive justice, which I judge would have little appeal to McGee.
Professor Calabresi believes that whatever its theoretical merit the theory can be largely disre-
garded for policy-making purposes under a condition which would normally be satisfied. This condi-
tion is that the policy change be made within a reasonably confined category (Calabresi uses the ex-
ample of a $Soo automobile cost increase for brakes). Thus, if the direct allocative effects in the
industry or economic area under scrutiny are favorable and limited, the more remote effects, whether
for good or ill, can be ignored on the basis that in whatever direction they cut, they will do no great
damage to the economy. See G. CALABRESi, THE Cosr oF AccmN'rs 86-88 (,970). Curiously, McGee
seems to agree that antitrust meets that condition, for he says at one point that even a misdirected
antitrust policy would be unlikely to do any critical injury to the economy as a whole. Pp. 132-33.
All of this leads some economists toward a "third best" solution, which would attack specific
concentrations of monopoly power and misallocations so as to move the economy generally toward
a more competitive stance. Such a "third best" solution would support existing antitrust policy. See
F. SCHERER, supra.
I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Jon Hirschoff, for comments on this footnote.
18. Thus, Professor Joe Bain's study, showing a substantially higher profit rate in industries where
the eight-firm concentration ratios exceed 70 percent has been highly suggestive for public policy.
I made use of the Bain findings in my 1967 article on oligopoly power as a convenient point at
which to define "proscribed oligopoly market," as to which special rules of law might be made
applicable. Brodley, supra note 2O, at 347.
19. P. 127.
20. Pp. 94, z27-28. See also Brozen, The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommenda-
tiOn, 13 J. LAw & EcoN. 279 (1970).
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to unsettle somewhat a correlation many thought well established.21 More
fundamental to McGee's viewpoint, however, than where the weight of
the evidence lies on this issue is his assertion that the profit studies are
simply irrelevant because the level of profits in and of themselves provides
no measure of desirable industry performance in the consumer interest.
To ascertain this we must look also to consumer welfare, and as to this,
as discussed in Section III, McGee's view is that profits by themselves can-
not enlighten us in view of the gains consumers may realize through in-
dustrial efficiencies.
Turning to innovation and invention, defenders of industrial concen-
tration can draw support from the work of Joseph Schumpeter, who urged
that only massive industrial size can make rapid innovation possible under
modern technology." Similar views are expressed by Galbraith, who has
urged the necessity of the planned market to draw forth the massive capital
investment required by modern large scale technology.2 Thus, when it
comes to a discussion of innovation-in contrast to an emphasis on profits-
there is existing economic theory, apart from the Chicago School, in support
of large size. But, is the evidence contained in several recent empirical
studies of innovation consistent with the theory? In other words, are the
largest firms the most innovative? The question is important, but, as McGee
points out, poses difficulties. How is innovation to be measured exactly?
Since it clearly cannot be measured directly, proxies for this elusive quality
must be found. Researchers have variously attempted to measure this di-
mension by examining research and development expenditures or alter-
natively, research and development employment, number of patents issued,
and number of "important" patents issued."
It is striking that all studies fail to establish a correlation between largest
firm size and maximum innovation, however measured. McGee dismisses
most of the studies as measuring mere inputs into research (i.e., research
expenditures) as distinct from research outputs (i.e., inventions)." Turning
to the studies that are directed at the outputs of research laboratories, McGee
finds the work of economist Edwin Mansfield to be truly impressive.
Having survived the meticulous scrutiny of McGee's analysis, Mansfield's
work invites our careful attention.2
21. See also F. ScHmRR, INDusTnUAL MARxET STucTuR AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 184-86
(1971). Reviewing the evidence, Professor Scherer, while admitting that doubts remain, concludes that
"the bulk of the evidence supports the hypothesis that profits increase with the degree to which market
power is concentrated in the hands of a few sellers." Id. at x86.
22. See J. ScHmu EamR, CA1PITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (942), quoted in P. SAMUEL-
SON, ECONoimcs: AN INTRoDUCToRY ANALYSIS 92-93 ( 7 th ed. x967).
23. J. GALBRAIm, THE NEw INDUsTmiAL STATrE 35-45, 289-218 (2967).
24. Pp. 98, io2-i9 (discussing empirical studies by Worley, Hamberg, Comanor, Williamson,
Scherer, and Mansfield).
25. Pp. 98-99.
26. E. MANSFIELD, THE EcoN moics OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1968); E. MANSFIELD, INDuS-
TRIAL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (i968).
June 1972] xx63
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Mansfield's findings, consistent with those of other economists who have
sought to measure innovation, reveal an absence of correlation between
maximum industrial concentration and highest levels of invention and
innovation. In a study of thirty large firms in five industries, Mansfield
found that inventive output (measured by the number and importance of
patents issued) was lower for the largest firms in an industry than for
second level firms. Separating the concept of innovation (first application
of invention) from invention, the situation was mixed in the four industries
studied. Although the four largest firms ranked high in innovation, in two
of the three industries where this proved to be true the absolute peak rate
was achieved not by one of the four largest firms, but by the sixth largest
firm in the market."
The strongest policy argument against attacking industrial concentra-
tion which McGee draws from the studies on innovation and invention
rests on Mansfield's finding that the large firm of today is apt to be the
successful innovator of yesterday. Following successful innovation, a firm
tended to grow faster than its competitors. Thus, urges McGee, a public
policy which would forcibly break up large firms imposes a penalty on
successful past innovation and a negative incentive to future innovation.!8
Even accepting McGee's factual premise, the conclusion seems extreme.
There is simply no data td support the conclusion that growth to massive
size alone provides the necessary and sufficient incentive for innovation.
Nor is a theory offered to explain why this should be so, particularly con-
sidering that McGee labors mightily to deny a correlation between largest
size and highest profit. Indeed, it seems inherently implausible that the
rewards and incentives should be so neatly balanced. As Professor William-
son has pointed out, growth to market dominating size, whether the result
of innovative achievement or other causes, may as readily be the conse-
quence of inferior performance by competitive firms as superior perfor-
mance by the dominant firm2 Moreover, the issue is not so much whether
growth to market dominance is to be prohibited, but whether there should
be a limit on how long it is to be tolerated."0
Thus, even were it true that such a growth-based incentive existed, the
appropriate policy response would not necessarily be continued tolerance
of dominating size. An equally effective alternative might be to increase
the innovative reward of the limited term patent system. The very existence
of the patent reward is a clear recognition that the incentives of the private
27. Pp. 2O6-15.
28. Pp. 111-12.
29. WiHiamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations,
85 HAv. L. REv. 1512, 1517 (1972).
30. Id. at 1523-24, citing Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Regulatory Policies, 82
HAI.v. L. REv. 1207, 1216, X220-21 (1969).
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enterprise system are considered insufficient to induce desired levels of in-
novation. The most obvious response if such incentives are inadequate is
to increase them directly, by open subsidy."1 This avoids the dangerous side
consequence of more permanent single firm dominance or concentrated
oligopoly, an avoidance all the more vital in light of Mansfield's basic find-
ing, that whatever innovative spur the lure of growth may bring, the evi-
dence is solid that once having achieved dominance, a firm can make no
showing of superior innovative achievement.
III. Ti T EoRY oF BIG Fnuvm Surmio~iTy
What remains is to confront McGee's major thesis: that big firms are
superior by the only criterion that counts. That criterion is economic wel-
fare-the sum total of consumer welfare and aggregate business profit."2
Economic welfare rests on firm efficiency: present productive efficiency and
future innovative advance. By the standard of these efficiencies, which can
also be described in terms of superior foresight, productive capacity, know-
how and innovative response, large firms in concentrated markets are
simply better than other firms. How do we know this? Despite its seeming
redundancy, what McGee asserts is that we know big firms are superior
simply because they are big! Markets are "biased toward efficiency..
and "market results are evidence of efficiency.""3
The firm that has grown big has proven its superior efficiency or inno-
vative capacity. If this were not so, new capital would flow into the market
and new enterprises would enter. McGee challenges economists and schol-
33. Indeed, one recent review suggests that the single most effective means of stimulating inno-
vation may be to provide government funds for research to smaller firms, for they have shown them-
selves to be the best innovators. See Utterback, The Process of Innovation: A Review of Some Recent
Findings, in TECHNOLOGiCAL DEVELOpMENT AND EcoNo isc GROWTH 339, 157 (G. Wilson ed. 197)
(this study also adds additional support to the lack of correlation between firm size and innovation,
citing studies even more recent than Mansfield's).
32. Pp. 13, 75-79, ioo-os. Economic welfare, as so defined, is equivalent for McGee to maxi-
mizing output. Id. Output consists of the total value of goods produced, including profits realized to
producers and consumer surplus. Following Stigler, McGee defines consumer surplus as "the dollar
value by which the consumer is better off with a given price and consumption than he would be with
none of the good at all." P. x4o n.i. As Stigler puts it, this is the amount in excess of price that a
consumer would pay rather than go without the good altogether. See G. STIGLER, THE T EoRY oF
PRME, 78 (x966). As so defined, consumer surplus, under simplifying assumptions, is the area under
the demand curve and above the current price. P. 149 n.45. See also P. SArMUELSON, EcoNoMIcs 418
n.ii (8th ed. 2970).
McGee's concept of economic welfare, as stated, includes both consumer surplus and firm profit
(or producer surplus). They are treated as equivalents in social value in that Si of consumer surplus
is no better or worse than $i of business profit. Thus, large dollar increases in business profit accom-
panied by relatively smaller dollar losses of consumer welfare would promote overall economic welfare
in McGee's terms. Moreover, it is possible, as McGee takes pains to demonstrate, for both business
profits and consumer surplus to increase at the same time, and for firms in an oligopoly market to
contribute more to consumer surplus than would firms in a competitive market. This will occur where
the oligopoly firm enjoys large cost advantages, due for example to scale efficiencies, over the necessar-
ily smaller firms that would exist if the market were more competitive. The gain from the oligopoly
efficiencies can result in both higher profits and lower prices, and hence a larger consumer surplus.
33. P. 130.
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ars who disagree with this view to "pool their resources," enter the market
and "with their superior information and intellect, make personal for-
tunes."" The failure of new capital to enter concentrated markets is no
indication of flaws in the capital markets, but simply further evidence that
"some activities are complex, demanding, and risky, and that experience
and competence count."3 5
Indeed, McGee asserts that "[m]ost are not shocked to learn that genius
is rare; that an auto firm with a prime Henry Ford was richly endowed;
that a small proportion of sport fishermen catch most of the fish; and that
relatively few economists do almost all the publishing."3 "
If this analysis is accepted it becomes clear why oligopoly models and
empirical studies are irrelevant for McGee. The oligopoly models skipped
the question of efficiencies altogether by assuming that all size distributions
of firms were equally efficient. The empirical data on profits simply mea-
sured the wrong factor. In themselves profits tell us nothing about pro-
ductive efficiency or consumer benefits. A high profit, efficient firm can
quite possibly sell at lower prices than can a zero profit inefficient firm.
Only the empirical studies of innovation approached a meaningful inquiry
for they attempted to measure innovative performance. Although McGee
discounts the results of such studies on statistical and measurement grounds,
he ultimately rejects them on the analytical basis already stated. Large firms
are superior as innovators because they remain large. If they were not,
smaller more innovative firms would grow at their expense and rapidly
deconcentrate the market.3 7
And so we penetrate to the core of the McGee analysis-an unshakable
belief in the operation of the free market. Here, indeed, is McGee's leap of
faith, which is in the face of the joint concern expressed by both the Neal
and Stigler White House Task Force Reports on the existence in concen-
trated industries of price leadership. "8 One of the rare points of agreement
between the two reports is the recognition that stubborn persistence of
price leadership is simply inconsistent with the existence of a workably
competitive market. Where large firms in concentrated markets can price
their goods non-competitively over prolonged periods without new entry
or other challenge, the classical free market does not exist. Others of the
classical viewpoint have been quick to grasp the philosophical threat that
this fact poses. (It would strain credulity to the breaking point to maintain
that all such firms in all such markets had achieved unmatchable efficien-
34. P. 51
35- PP. 51-52.
36. P. 4.
37- PP- 121-22.
38. Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy [The Neal Report], REvRrNrs FOx
Amsmrusr LAw & EcoN. 658 (x969); Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition
[The Stigler Report], id. at 843-46.
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cies.) Accordingly, the Stigler Report vigorously attacks collusion and de-
clines to rule out the extreme remedy of forced deconcentration.3 9 In a simi-
lar vein is Professor Posner's recent proposal to expand antitrust conspiracy
doctrine to encompass persistent price leadership; and by this means avoid
applying a structural solution to the problems of concentrated markets'
In addition to the above, McGee provides inadequate treatment of sev-
eral other factors that have been urged as distortions of the free market:
the possibility that capital barriers impede new entry, both because of
scarcity of funds for new entrants and the freedom and proclivity of exist-
ing firms to generate funds internally; the existence of inertia in all human
relations, including business relations which new market entrants must
break down by more than price shading; high start-up costs due to less
experience, know-how, and reputation, and differential costs in attracting
management talent;41 the identification of specific barriers to entry in many
concentrated industries;42 and the ability under the patent system (as it has
developed in the United States, but not generally in other advanced capital-
ist countries) to suppress as well as disseminate new discoveries."
In a later, more speculative portion of this Review (Section V) I shall
advance the idea that the classical model is vitally dependent on two addi-
tional assumptions that seem highly questionable: the free and effective
flow of consumer information and the efficacy and value of competition
as the driving power within the economic system. But I do not draw on
such concepts for immediate policy recommendations, and it is to these
recommendations which I now turn.
IV. ANTTUsT POLICY AND INDUSTRLAL CONCENTRATION
The dominant issue of modern antitrust centers around the policy to be
followed toward industrial concentration. The Neal Task Force Report
recommended forced deconcentration of highly concentrated industries.
Existing antitrust policy stops short of this, but it moves vigorously to pre-
vent additional concentration. Numerous other proposals have been made
to effect this policy. At one extreme are proposals to move toward atomistic
markets. A recent one suggested a divestiture against the Big Three auto-
39. Id. at 846.
40. Posner, supra note 14, at 1562. Although an interesting approach, it has its own built-in
limitations, such as the high costs of enforcement in a world of limited antitrust resources. The
issue in such cases would be far from simple-whether price or other uniformity by firms, absent
any overt understanding or conspiracy, was legitimate competitive parallelism or unlawful and de-
liberate uniformity of action. See note 14 supra. The approach is also heavily dependent on a single
theory of oligopoly behavior (Stigler's cartel theory) as to which there is no theoretical concensus
and as yet little empirical support. See text accompanying note 14 supra. See also Posner, supra note
14, at 1569 n.24, 1572 n.3i; Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 44, 59 (1968).
41. Williamson, supra note 29, at i52O-i.
42. See J. BAITN, BAu ErS TO NEw CopvETmoN (1956).
43. Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1945). See Kahn, The Role of Pat-
ents, in ComPETITION, CARTELs AND T-Mm EGoM..ATION 332 (J. Miller ed. 2962).
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mobile producers and the creation of 42 new producers." At the other ex-
treme is McGee's opposition to any general policy against concentration
as an obstacle to industrial efficiency.
Despite its imperfections, the American economy is impressively strong.
While speculations can be bold (see Section V), when it comes to policy de-
cision, political realism and the absence of well-developed alternatives con-
strain a more cautious approach, especially in changing structural factors.
Thus it becomes crucial to find out how far we can move without losing
any efficiency. Here the oligopoly theories and the empirical studies dealing
with innovation and invention are particularly relevant. Despite McGee's
vigorous arguments, I cannot find that he produces anything of substance
to show that there is a serious risk that deconcentration of the most concen-
trated markets would cause appreciable efficiency losses. On the key ques-
tion of invention and innovation, the evidence seems to point strongly in
the direction of the superiority of middle sized firms: for example, the sixth
largest firm in petroleum and coal." Indeed, these findings sufficiently
impress McGee to induce him to question whether mergers ought to be
permitted to allow firms to grow to such size.
Thus, I find that the totality of considerations coalesce in a policy of
moderate deconcentration of tight oligopoly markets and of vigilant resis-
tance against increased oligopoly concentration." Consistent with prevail-
ing theories of oligopoly and the empirical evidence reviewed above, such
a policy also offers the additional benefit of increasing the number of lead-
ership positions in industry and the number of decision-making centers, the
desirability of which seems clear. It diffuses economic and corporate power,
consistent with our general political bias toward fragmentation of political
power. It promotes greater experimentation in business since each separate
management is apt to make its own assessment of the problems confront-
ing it and to devise a differing approach to their solution. Moreover, as the
number of firms in an industry increases, more opportunities are available
to rise to a leadership position within a firm. And increased numbers of
firms in an industry make for greater job mobility alternatives for em-
ployees, as they can more readily change positions without loss of job
utility."
Moreover, these benefits can be achieved without running any ascertain-
44. See Note, Annual Style Changes in the Automobile Indttry as an Unfair Method of Com-
petition, 8o YALE L. J. 567, 6o8-zo (1971).
45. P. zo.
46. See Williamson, supra note 29, for a particularly cogent and restrained proposal to decon-
centrate industries dominated by single firms.
47. See Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in TM CoRoA 'ro IN Monmu
SOcMETY 75-76 (E. Mason ed. 196o); cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., rio F. Supp.
295, 347, afd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (". . . creativity in business as in other areas, is
best nourished by multiple centers of activity, each following its unique pattern and developing its
own esprit de corps.").
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able risk to our productive capabilities or efficiencies. Such risk would be
encountered only in the event of irreducible scale economies or unique,
management superiority, both of which are apt to be extremely rare oc-
currences in the mature industries that would be the likely candidates for
divestiture."8 While a divestiture program free of all risk is scarcely possible,
in the words of the Neal Report, ".... public policy must often be made
on the basis of imperfect knowledge, and the failure to adopt remedial
measures is in itself the acceptance of a policy." 9
To this McGee would no doubt reply, amplifying the argument made
in relation to innovation and size, that a public policy directed against
dominant firms is an unfair penalty on past industrial efficiency, and a nega-
tive incentive to future efficiency even if no present damage is done. In
response I would urge: First, such past "efficiencies" have not been ade-
quately described or analyzed. Success may have been a manifestation of
ruthless business practices as well as productive or marketing efficiencies;
a result of misleading advertising campaigns as well as product superiority;
a product of inefficiency and poor management by competitive firms as well
as sagacity and business excellence by the successful dominant firm."0 Sec-
ond, whatever the past efficiencies involved, growth to monopoly or domi-
nant size in the market tends to free the firm from effective present com-
petition. This leaves only the threat of future entry to replace the actual
competition that presumably was an incentive for the firm's past market
success. The threat of entry no doubt limits a firm's freedom to exploit a
monopolistic or dominant position, but most would not consider this as
equivalent to actual competition, particularly in mature industries. 1 While
one of the oligopoly theories discussed earlier does assert such an equiva-
lence,"2 it is distinctly a minority view, and it is not supported by the data
on patent innovation which showed dominant firms to be less than out-
standing in innovation."a
Third, it is unclear in any event why deconcentration of dominant firms
48. See Williamson, supra note 29, at 1513, 1517.
49. The Neal Report, supra note 38, at x6o. But cf. Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Divi-
sion, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 500, 506-07 (197), urging that antitrust policy be limited to areas of
virtual economic unanimity. Such an approach giving the Chicago School a virtual veto, would dras-
tically confine antitrust, limiting it to action against horizontal collusion. The need for such a
cautious, self-limiting policy would seem confined to situations in which appreciable economic risk is
encountered. But this is the very contingency that the limited approach urged here seeks to avoid.
Professor Posner also opposes deconcentration on the ground that it would be inherently un-
stable, since efficiencies of scale would cause rapid reconcentration of the market. Id. at 505. If this
be so, one might expect than an efficiency defense would prevail in the prior deconcentration pro-
ceeding; but if not, the efficiency loss would only be temporary under Posner's assumption, and thus
long run risk to our productive capabilities would seem to be avoided.
50. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
51. See Williamson, supra note 29, at X520-22. See also notes 41-43 supra and accompanying
text.
52. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 26 and 27 supra and accompanying text.
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would destroy incentives. The shareholders do not lose their investment;
rather they become shareholders in the newly created, spun off corporations
(with perhaps an injunction against cross-voting). A severe long run loss
would occur only if the divested companies were below efficient size or if
the supply of managerial talent were too small to staff the new companies.
Fourth, even if it can be shown that substantial efficiencies would be lost
through divestiture, the proponents of deconcentration-such as the Neal
Report-provide for a defense. "5 Where the policy of continued vigilance
against increased concentration and of moderate deconcentration falls short
is in its failure to offer no solution to the macroeconomic problem of cost-
plus inflation, toward which the joint forces of oligopoly markets and
powerful labor unions have pushed." Only a radical deconcentration could
hope to change this condition, and even then, only through economic up-
heavals and risks too large to be assumed. Furthermore, the remedy seems
to lie beyond the competence of effective antitrust policy."
V. Tim CLASSICAL MODEL AND Humo msc VALUES
I cannot conclude this review without expressing a deeper response to
what I have read. I have already used words such as "faith" and "belief,"
implying that mental responses in addition to strictly logical reasoning
are evoked by the classical model. Indeed, McGee, and perhaps others of
his persuasion, seem to be inspired by a belief in the classical model that
goes beyond the empirical evidence that can be adduced for or against it.
Their model is superior to other models, they seem to say, because of its
inherent plausibility, its elegant simplicity and also because of the char-
acter of the human conduct it predicts-and even possibly evokes.
Hence a deeper meaning for social science models is revealed. The social
science model is capable of influencing the very behavior it is seeking to
analyze. The model becomes a prophecy of human conduct and as such
may tend to mold, as well as model, reality. Thus, as it becomes a basis for
thinking and policymaking, the model interacts with its materials. This
may come through uncritical acceptance and rigidification of the values
imbedded in the status quo, which the model may incorporate without
explicit reference. Or it may come through over-emphasis of some par-
54. For a suggestion as to how divestiture might be carried out gradually and with cooperation
of the firm involved, so as to obviate any such difficulties, see Williamson, supra note 29, at 1527-30.
55. An efficiencies defense is also provided in the recently introduced Industrial Organization
Act bill. S. 3832, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See x8 CONG. REc. 11494 (daily ed. July 24, 1972)
(remarks of Senator Hart).
56. See Slawson, Price Controls for a Peacetime Economy, 84 Hanv. L. RaV. zo9o, io9 (971).
57. Id. Professor Slawson suggests that the profits in concentrated markets be limited by impos-
ing direct government price controls on firms in such markets. Under such controls firms would be
permitted to earn a fixed percentage on invested capital. Although Slawson is aware of the problems,
the experience of rate making by federal and state utility commissions (though based on different
rules) is not encouraging.
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ticular value made explicit in the model. As will be seen, both of these
phenomena have occurred here.
Therefore there is need for a high sensitivity to what might be called
the interactive effects (or externalities) of the model itself. The intellectual
task is such that no type of thinking ought to be held repugnant before a
model is found acceptable. A full human response to the model is called
for, not only analytic and systematic, but emotional, imaginative, intuitive;
for by this means we may sense dimensions that elude a more structured
approach. I now turn to such a consideration of the classical model in the
hope that I may help to bring to light two neglected parameters found in
that model: the flow of consumer information, and the acceptance of com-
petition as the prime force that moves the economic system.
A. The Flow of Consumer Information
Behind the fundamental proposition of classical economics that the free
market functions efficiently in the consumer interest is the basic premise
that the goal of the system is the maximum satisfaction of consumer wants.
For the purposes of this discussion let us accept this goal and the value sys-
tem it incorporates; and similarly let us accept the dynamic of competition
as a wholly desirable mechanism to achieve that goal. Having made these
assumptions, we are brought face to face with the problem of consumer
information. Consumer desires can be satisfied only if they are effectively
expressed and impressed upon the economic system. Thus, McGee must,
and does, affirm consumer sovereignty-that is, consumers in their in-
numerable individual buying decisions reveal their desires and preferences
for all the world to see, and thereby compel producers to compete in
satisfying these wants.
The classical model is insensitive to the distinction between the pro-
duction of goods and services themselves and the flow of information about
such goods and services, for it views information as simply another field
of battle on which rival firms struggle for the favor of the sovereign con-
sumer. It is assumed that rivalry among sellers will motivate them to supply
consumers with the information that will persuade them to buy. The re-
sult will be that consumers receive the kind and quality of information
which they desire and for which they are willing to pay. 8 Some have even
sought to use a political analogy, asserting that the consumer "votes" with
his dollars in the same way that he votes with his political ballot; and that
if we trust him with the latter, it hardly makes sense not to trust him with
the former."
A far different model is more reflective of reality. It is so different, that
58. Pp. 47-48.
59. See, e.g., Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 47, 62 (1969).
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what I wish to state is best expressed by an allegory. Notwithstanding the
influence of consumerism, there remains a need for a new paradigm, as
McGee's book perhaps demonstrates. Imagine, if you will, two enormous
containers. In one are consumers; in the other are goods and services in
uncounted variety. Each consumer, a finite being with limited time and
resources, wishes to obtain a narrow selection of the available goods and
services, but he has no way of finding out what is available except by ob-
serving narrow bands of light flowing from the goods and services container
to the consumer container; and, the lights are continually flashing on and
off. The bands of light are themselves sold to producers for varying lengths
of time, but they are costly and relatively few producers can afford to buy
them in any quantity. Nor is there effective control over how much of the
available spectrum may be preempted for any one type of goods or by any
one producer. As a result, information about some goods and some pro-
ducers is flashed with high frequency, while little or no information is
flashed about other types of goods and other producers. The only way that
the consumer can communicate with producers is through the feeble
imprint of his own individual buying decision. Yet the buying decisions
of any single consumer are utterly insignificant. The producer is concerned
with aggregate, not individual, buying behavior. Reduced to a mere re-
ceptor of information, inundated by a massive flow of data, the consumer
must somehow filter out from a sea of inputs the information he needs
in order to make numerous buying decisions each year.6" A consumer can
afford to give this task only a small fraction of his time, yet all of his time
would not be sufficient.
Finally, as a responsive human being, not an inanimate object, the con-
sumer's behavior is in part determined by his environment. Thus, the vast
inflow of messages eventually influences his response to future messages,
and tends to some degree to mold him into the type of man who will re-
spond to the messages sent. 1 Only a diminished view of man can lead the
observer to the acceptance of a situation, in which, to quote McGee, a con-
sumer lighting up a particular cigarette "thereby enjoys the company of
silent, smiling, and carefree nymphs who caress watercress and mountain
creeks with bare toes."6 If the described consumer response to advertising
is accurate then the information flow is even more than a distorting factor
inhibiting the free expression of consumer wants. It becomes an assault on
the human psyche itself.
6o. It is therefore hardly remarkable that he shows such high loyalty to familiar brands, and
that he will pay more for a well advertised Clorox than a chemically identical bleach. See Procter &
Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1534, 1538 (963), aff'd 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
61. Cf. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 4-7 (increasing consumer affluence makes consumers
more susceptible to producer control). See also K. BOULDINo, ECONOMICS AS A SCeMNCe 15-17 (1970).
62. P. 4 7 .
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Without question the growth of consumerism manifested by Ralph
Nader's influence, the prospect of a vigorous federal consumer protection
agency, and a greater consumer self-awareness, have made important in-
roads into the extreme described above. The existence of explicit and spe-
cialized advocates for the consumer interest hopefully may end gross
abuses, such as unsafe automobiles and life-threatening ecological damage.
It has become "good business" for some firms to adopt highly publicized
consumer-oriented stances. 3 Yet this progress does not establish the rule of
consumer sovereignty.
Eventually, whether modified by the forces of the new consumer move-
ment or not, the classical assumption of consumer sovereignty breaks down
when applied to the information flow." What is needed is a radical re-
ordering of our thinking. We need to recognize what Professor Boulding
has called the "infosphere": the existence of an entirely distinct system of
information inputs, outputs and feedbacks, which at every point conditions
the preferences and responses of consumers." For this approach to make
consumers sovereign in fact, as well as in theory, requires a drastic inter-
vention into and change in the existing system. The most basic problem
is to alter the essentially one-way flow of consumer information, whereby
the initiative always rests in the hands of producers.6 By way of contrast,
suppose that consumers were provided with the means, via a computer-
communication network, to ask for and receive specified information on
goods and services; to screen themselves from a barrage of information that
they do not desire; to communicate with other consumers and consumer
groups; and by this and other means, gradually to open the channels of
information to a variety of consumer voices. To be sure, the feasibility and
costs of such a change in the information system are unknown. This is par-
ticularly true in light of two obstacles the system would have to meet: (i)
the consumer response must not be made so unpredictable that market and
production planning become impossible, and (2) the cost of goods and
services in the aggregate should not be affected adversely (changes in costs
of particular goods would be expected). The conclusion that seems in-
63. See Shafer, A Food Chain Recruits a Consumer Advocate to Shape Its Policies, Wall Street
journal, Jan. 13, 1972, at i, col. 6; McGregor, Skeptical Consumers, Tough Regulators Spur a New
Candor in Ads, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 12, 3972, at x, col. i.
64. See K. BOULDING, supra note 61, at 17.
65. Id. at 15-17. See also E. MISHAN, THE CosTS oF EcoNomic GROWTH 109-12 (3967).
66. See Katona, Consumer Behavior: Theory and Findings on Expectations and Aspirations, 58
Az. Ecois. REv. 19, 28-30 (x968), which suggests that neither the classical consumer-sovereignty
model nor the consumer-dominated model is realistic, but that a more appropriate model is one of
joint producer-consumer interaction. This model, which would incorporate "principles of social
learning," sees producers and consumers as engaged in a two-way learning process. Far from entirely
dominating consumer response, producers must "swim with the current and . . . find out in what
direction the consumer is moving and what is acceptable to him .... "
The above producer-consumer interaction model appears to me to have more credence in the
short run than in the long period unless the system of information flow is altered. Time works
against consumer autonomy when channels of communication are mostly in the hands of producers.
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escapable, however, is that if the classical concept of consumer sovereignty
is to be realized new methods of consumer expression and communication
must be developed." If it should turn out that there is no effective way to
realize the consumer sovereignty doctrine then we must indeed face the
question of who should have the power to plan our markets, and by what
standards.
In the meantime, analysis of economic markets, and perhaps gradually
economic and antitrust regulations, could be deepened by treating the infor-
mation flow as a separate parameter of market description. Thus, the defini-
tion of the economic market might be expanded to include accurate data
on how producers transmit and consumers receive information about the
product market, the frequency and type of information received, and some
assessment of how the information flow affects competition and consumer
choice in the market. It would be pertinent to ask what part the informa-
tion flow (e.g., product information) plays in the creation and maintenance
of market concentration. Does the concept of economic efficiency have the
same meaning when applied to information about goods, as it does to their
other characteristics ?"s A sharper focus of economic regulatory policy on
the parameter of information may already be observed in the Federal Trade
Commission's sustained attack on advertising claims."
B. The Value of Competition
To suggest that the flow of information about goods cannot be left solely
to unregulated competition does not require a fundamental rejection of
the classical model. The same cannot be said for the role of competition
itself. While all capitalist systems include competition or interfirm rivalry
as an important dynamic, the classical model is distinctive in makng com-
petition for profits the prime and self-sufficient instrument.
Absent from both McGee's and the classical analysis is any recognition
of the social, emotional and psychological costs of competition. Yet today
the costs of competition may well be under the heaviest scrutiny since the
Industrial Revolution." Ecological concerns call into question the virtues
67. Steps that have been taken to improve consumer information thus far have been rudimen-
tary. Voluntary organizations, such as Consumers Union, reach only relatively small numbers of
predominantly middle class consumers, and effective use of the information generally requires care-
ful reading, research through back issues, and diligent shopping.
68. See Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1534, 1562-66 (1963), for an example of one decision
which sought to address itself to such an inquiry. The Supreme Court, affirming, did not discuss this
aspect of the ease, however. F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
But see Posner, Advertising and Product Diflerentiation, r J. Rs'mirrs FoR ANTrRUST LAw &
EcoN'. 874-78 (1969).
69. The Wall Street journal, June ix, 1971, at 2, col. 5. Moving in the same direction is the
recent statement of the FTC to the Federal Communications Commission supporting "counterad-
vertising" or right of media access by proponents of opposing views on topics of public importance
in advertising. FTC Announces Its Support for Concept of Counter-Advertising, BNA ATRR No.
545, at A- (Jan. 1', 1972).
70. Thus, reflecting a rather widely held view of the "counter-culture," Charles Reich writes:
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of a competition which would penalize the conservation-minded firm over
its less socially aware competitors. The ecological problem might be met to
some extent by new taxes and subsidies keyed to ecological costs; further-
more, profits as the exclusive measure of desirable firm behavior might be
broadened to include new indicators of social responsibility. 71 Neverthe-
less, there is no escaping the fundamental question posed by the competi-
tive ethic: Do we really want our economic lives ruled by a system of naked
competitive rivalry? By relying wholly on the force of competition the
classical system exalts that force. Ecological taxes and new corporate re-
sponsibility indicators become simply additional constraints to be sur-
mounted or circumvented, as may be most expedient in the light of cold,
pragmatic assessment.
The single minded concentration of business energies on the competitive
struggle reduces other values to mere instrumentalities for securing the end
of competitive success. The classical model thereby not only enshrines the
competitive ethic, but makes it self-perpetuating and self-intensifying. The
system thus works to maximize not only profits, but it increases the number
of men who will serve that goal; men who would play each advantage to
the hilt, and who in the name of profits would, to the extent the law per-
mits and public opinion tolerates, destroy a competitor, fire a long standing
distributor or dismiss an aging employee. Can it be doubted that the logic
of the system points in this direction, when each such act serves to make
the firm more efficient in the classical sense, better able to serve consumer
desires and to maximize its profits. What cannot be registered in the classi-
cal system is the consideration that whatever gain might result from higher
productivity would be more than offset by the cruelties inflicted. And the
"costs" would be borne not only by the victims, but by all of us who would
have to exist in such a desensitized world. That this degree of harshness
may seldom be fully realized does not solve the problem of whether we
should guide our economic action by a theory that accepts it as a norm.
The "iron law of competition" of classical economics turns out to be simply
too Prussian a value to guide our economic lives.7
In sum, the competitive system of classical economics, geared solely
to the maximum satisfaction of material consumer wants, fails to reflect
essential human values. The elegant simplicity of the classical model is
"Consciousness H does not believe in the antagonistic or competitive doctrine of life." C. RaicH, Tim
GEENIG OF AMERICA 226 (1970).
71. See Andrews, Government Statistics Are Termed Misleading a5 Gauges of Society, The Wall
Street journal, Dec. i6, 1971, at !, col. i.
72. See Fusfeld, Post-Post-Keynes: The Shattered Syntheses, SAT. REv., Jan. 22, 1972, at 36, 39
(stressing the need for a new paradigm that would incorporate a greater concern for human values);
cf. J. Huusr, Tim LEorrnmiAcy oF T Busrsass CousoRAsToN s ns m LAW oF Tm UNrrED STATES
68-70, 84, io-ii, 163-64 (1970) (tracing the growth of the policy motivating corporate law from
a primary focus on increased economic productivity to wider, if not yet fully articulated, social goals).
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possible only because of its narrow, materialistic view of human aspiration
and fulfillment. To say that the model does not include values that are
sensitive to non-economic needs may evoke cynicism, but that response
would only underscore what I have been trying to say about the exclusive-
ness of the competitive ethic in an economic system built upon the classical
assumption, a system which in the words of Chicago economist Frank H.
Knight "teaches men to think of each other as competitors and not as co-
workers."73
Must we then reject the value of competition altogether? Is there no
acceptable human meaning for competition? I find it unnecessary to reach
this extreme. It is the raising up of competition to a position of exclusive
value that is the abuse, not its existence as one of a constellation of values.
Indeed, the force of competition, when properly controlled and bridled,
may play an indispensable role. Ascertaining the appropriate role for com-
petition begins with the recognition that a social organization, similar to
an individual personality, is inherently imperfect. Both, however, are ca-
pable of learning and improvement. Perhaps the greatest indictment of a
monopoly is that like the sole merchant in an isolated town, the monopoly
is saddled with its own imperfections. How is it to find out where it is fall-
ing short? How can it avoid becoming self-satisfied and stagnant? How can
it learn to improve? Despite the importance of more humanistic values,
how else can these needs be met except by competition?
Competition so viewed can be seen as a corrective force. Competition
confronts the firm or individual with alternative approaches. It provides a
feedback effect. It assures that the consumers will have alternatives. Di-
version or threatened diversion of business to competitors compels a firm to
ask itself periodically whether there may be better, more effective ways of
doing what it is now doing. While under this interpretation we cannot
do without competition, it is unnecessary that it be unremitting, destructive
or ruthless.7 If we abandon consumer want satisfaction as our single goal,
73. F. KNIGHT, Economic Psychology and the Value Problem, in THE ETHIcs OF Coaln'rrro.
AND OTHER EssAYs 103 (1935): "People . . . are coming to feel that much of our toil and trouble
serves no end but to feed the increasing fires of competitive display and greed of power, and are
asking whether life has to be a relentless struggle for distinction and domination, or whether a bit
more of friendliness might not be worth some sacrifice, if necessary, of the touted physical ease and
comfort which few get and fewer have time to enjoy ...and it may yet be far more important
that competition teaches men to think of each other as competitors and not as co-workers, and to
see their relation to their work as that of the slave to his treadmill" (emphasis in original). See also
Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 CoLum L. REv. 399, 444 (1962), referring to
"this curious free-market world where an obviously moral or decent or humane action has to be
apologized for on the ground that conceivably, you may somehow make money by it."
74. For an analogy between economic and biological competition, stressing the feedback effects
in a competitive model, and the necessity for long term stability of the model maintaining competi-
tion within a zone where competitive forces are neither too strong nor too weak, see Harding, The
Cybernetics of Competition: A Biologist's View of Society in MoDERN SYsTEMs REsEARCH FoR rHE
B.mAVIoRAL ScraNTzsr 449 (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
Supporting this thesis is the historic reluctance of public authority-legislative, executive or
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it is no longer necessary for the system to squeeze every ounce of efficiency
and profit out of the market regardless of cost. We need not chafe if small
competitors are somewhat protected. The more restrained, teaching func-
tion of competition is fulfilled if the market provides viable alternatives
in the production of goods. This function is not fulfilled if there is a single
dominant firm, or even if two or three firms dominate the market; or if
the firms in the market collude. Therefore an antitrust policy that insists
on maintaining and expanding structurally competitive markets and vigor-
ously opposes collusion is desirable. This view of competition also leads to
the suggestion that greater recognition be given, as it is in European anti-
trust theory, to promoting equality of firm size in concentrated markets as
a desirable goal in itself.7" Thus, other things being equal, four leading
firms, having roughly equal market shares of io percent each, would pro-
vide a preferable market structure to one firm with 25 percent and the next
three with 5 percent each, although in both cases the four-firm concentra-
tion ratio is the same. The more equalized market gives greater assurance
of avoiding single-firm dominance and preserving a system of viable alter-
natives for consumers.7
Moreover, such a view of competition lessens the tension between the
classical objective of maximizing consumer welfare and the economic goals
based on such broader political and social values as equality of economic
opportunity and free access to markets7 This is not to suggest that there is
an easy answer to the questions of when and to what extent economic effi-
ciency should be sacrificed for other values. It is to suggest that the ques-
tion is legitimate, and that it becomes so just as soon as the mind is freed
from the narrow tyranny of devotion to the single principle of competitive
advantage.78 To free the mind is, surely, only a first step. For one then must
go on to build a creative, viable alternative. This would require a precise
judicial-to tolerate destructive competition, but almost invariably to intervene and to ameliorate
the destructive effects of competition. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933); J. BAIN, ITMUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 428-39 (959); L. WEISS, ECONOmIIcs AND AmERICAN
INDusTRY iix-i8 (:961).
75. Mueller, The Policy of the European Coal and Steel Community Towards Mergers and
Agreements by Steel Companies, 14 ATrrrrusr BuLL. 413, 429 (1969).
76. Other things would not be equal, of course, if the equalized market could be achieved only
by a severe loss of scale efficiencies. Yet in that case the future existence of the smaller firms becomes
highly questionable, unless they can grow to the scale of the efficient firm; but then the conditions
of equality would be achieved.
77. See Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism and
Cynicism, 67 MicH. L. REv. 325, 332, 334 (1968) (equality of opportunity and free access to mar-
kets are in the nature of social and political rights akin to civil rights). See also Blake & Jones,
In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLUm. L. Rav. 377 (x965) (equality of opportunity as a legitimate goal
of antitrust); Note, The Logic of Foreclosure: Tie-In Doctrine After Fortner v. U.S. Steel, 79 YALE
L.J. 86 (1969) (applying concept to tie-in area).
78. Some economists have come to recognize this concept. Cf. D. DEwaY, THE THoRY oF
ImrERac'r Com'ETrrboN: A RADicAL RECONSTRUCTION 199 (1969): "No intellectually respectable
argument for antitrust can be advanced that does not rest squarely on the value judgment that some
amount of economic welfare ought to be sacrificed to ensure some amount of intra-industry com-
petition."
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statement of the revised values and goals for economic legal policy, and
eventually the development of a model to give such goals operational mean-
ing. Clearly this is a future task that is as massive as it is urgent, involving
philosophical as well as economic and legal considerations. Perhaps it will
be helpful, nevertheless, to attempt a statement of possible interim goals for
economic policy which seem to move in the correct direction.
VI. CoNcLusIoN: A TENTATV REsTATEMEN oF GoALs
The classical model with its single goal of consumer want maximization
is seriously inadequate as the foundation of legal economic policy. It cannot
effectively support a policy of toleration toward unchecked industrial con-
centration. Indeed, McGee's In Defense of Industrial Economics has not
demonstrated, except by assumption, that such concentration is necessary
even to serve the model's own goal of consumer want maximization. More-
over, the model is deficient in two fundamental essentials: first, in its fail-
ure to consider the separate parameter of information flow; and second, in
its failure to evaluate the implications and costs of an exclusive reliance on
competitive rivalry for profit as the motivation for business behavior. A
more humanistic and holistic approach requires inclusion of other values.
In this spirit and without attempting to be definitive, I would suggest the
following interim economic-legal goals in the area of microeconomic pol-
icy. These would be in addition to the goal of consumer want maximiza-
tion, which is retained: (i) a reasonable distribution of economic power
so that no one, or even three or four firms, is dominant in a market; (2)
the opening up of the channels of commercial communication to incorpo-
rate a greater diversity of viewpoint and freedom of expression to, from
and by consumers; (3) the recognition of equality of business opportunity
and free access to markets as legitimate policy goals in themselves; and (4)
a quality of economic life which, while intolerant of collusion and market
dominance, is not impelled even in theory toward ruthless or unrestrained
competition, and thereby remains free to recognize other social values.
Whether in mathematics or public policy, the maximizing of several
functions at once is a task of far greater complexity than is the maximizing
of a single function. The complexity is unavoidable. It is but another re-
flection of the difficulty of actualizing human values in a complex world."'
79. Cf. Von der Groeben, Competition Policy as Part of Economic Policy in the Common Mm-
ket, 1965 BULLETIN OF = EUROPEAN EcoNoMIc CommuNrrz, No. 8, reprinted in E. STmu&
P. HAY, LAw AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIc AREA, 564-66 (1967): "[O~ur competition policy
is not an end in itself but a means of attaining maximum productivity, satisfaction of demand, well-
being and economic freedom for everybody in the Community. Competition also provides the basis
for a distribution of income and property consonant with social justice, which must be supplemented
by an effective social and incomes policy."
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